Abstract: China remains the pre-eminent recipient of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) among developing countries. FDI flows to the country continued to rise even during and after the recent global financial and economic crises, when many multinational enterprises (MNEs) found themselves in difficulties, demonstrating the continuing popularity of China as an investment destination. Nonetheless, other developing countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, are starting to steal China's thunder, offering themselves as cheaper alternatives. Although FDI stock in China reached a new high of US$ 711 billion in 2011, IFDI attraction is losing its former high priority in the Government's arsenal of economic policies, especially as the focus is turned ever more sharply on promoting outward investment. Now that domestic enterprises have taken over most of the functions provided by foreign investment in the first two decades of economic reform (i.e., the 1980s and 1990s), IFDI policies are being concentrated on honing the investment attraction effort to bring in foreign investments capable of filling gaps in the country's industrial structure and helping China meet policy goals such as environmental protection and energy conservation.
billion and Russia US$ 75 billion (annex table 2). In 2009, China's FDI inflows fell to US$ 95 billion as a result of the global economic crisis, then recovered strongly in 2010, when they reached US$ 115 billion and rose further to US$ 124 billion in 2011, while India's IFDI flows fell continuously since their peak in 2008 to US$ 24 billion in 2010 before making a partial recovery to US$ 32 billion in 2011. Russian IFDI flows recovered from their 2009 plunge to US$ 43 billion in 2010 and US$ 53 billion in 2011, and Brazilian IFDI flows followed a similar recovery reaching US$ 49 billion in 2010 and US$ 59 billion in 2011 (annex table 2). The relatively good performance of China's IFDI during both the Asian crisis of 1997-1998 and the recent global crises reflects international investor perceptions of China as a reliable risk-avoidance haven and even a potential locomotive of global growth in years to come, as it moves steadily toward becoming the world's largest economy.
Partly because of China's World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments to a phased opening up of services to foreign participation during the five years following accession in December 2001, the share of the tertiary sector in total IFDI flows rose from 31% in 2001 to 39% in 2010. At the same time, the share of the secondary sector declined from 66% to 58% and the always relatively tiny share of the primary sector shrank from 4% to under 3% (annex table 3).
While IFDI in manufacturing rose from US$ 31 billion (utilized) in 2001 to US$ 1,400 billion (contractual value) in 2010, the sector's share of total IFDI stock declined from 66% to 58% (annex table 3). The decline reflects a more rapid rise in IFDI in services, including, among others, financial services. Since 2002, foreigners can participate in China's stock markets as qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs); as the qualifications required have become less strict, an increasing number of QFIIs have set up offices in China. 4 Foreign banks have also expanded their operations as these have been increasingly allowed to conduct various banking services, including foreign currency services, for Chinese enterprises since 2002, Chinese yuan services since 2006 and credit card issuance since 2007. At the same time, while the burgeoning domestic market has continued to attract manufacturers, the increase in labor costs, more recently resulting from a wave of strikes in foreign affiliates, has prompted foreign investors to plan new investments in lower-cost economies such as Vietnam and Bangladesh.
China's IFDI is mainly sourced in Asian economies. 5 "Round-tripping" refers here to the practice of Chinese investors setting up special purpose entities in territories outside China, including Hong Kong (China), which is treated as a source of foreign investment by the Chinese authorities, to invest in China and so benefit from fiscal incentives offered to foreign investors. Since it is often intended to deceive the authorities, roundtripping is impossible to estimate. The practice may be in decline as a result of the abolition of foreign investment incentives from Recent large greenfield investments also show a tendency to focus on China's domestic market. The domestic market has always been the main target of foreign investors --even in the early days of the 1980s when China wanted them to confine themselves to export manufacturing as it kept its domestic market closed. Current policy as stated in the 12th Five Year Plan is now the reverse: the economy is to be restructured to give more weight to the relatively underdeveloped domestic market and de-emphasize exports, and FDI is to play its part by focusing on China's domestic market. Recent large greenfield investments aimed largely at the domestic market included automobiles and automobile components (by Daimler, Volkswagen, Yulon, Hyundai, BMW) (annex 
Effects of the recent global crisis and policy scene
As noted in the first Columbia FDI Profile on China's IFDI 9 , China was less seriously affected by the global financial and economic crisis than were many other countries because of its relatively small exposure to the US sub-prime market and its highly effective -though not cost-free -counter-crisis stimulus package. After having fallen by 12% in 2009 (leaving it still well above the 2007 level), IFDI flows recovered in 2010, rising by 21% to US$ 115 billion, above the peak of US$ 108 billion recorded in 2008. There was an FDI inflow of US$ 124 billion in 2011, an increase of 8% over that of 2010.
There has been no major change in the direction of China's policies toward inward FDI during 2009-2010. The Government has continued to liberalize the FDI framework in incremental steps. 10 In 2010, it raised the ceiling on provincial examination and approval authority over foreign investment projects in the "permitted" category of the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, 11 from US$ 100 million to US$ 300 million. (The US$ 50 million ceiling on projects in the "restricted catalogue" remains unchanged.) In 2011, examination and approval procedures were removed from the establishment of a branch, which is not subject to any special requirement.
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There have been several decisions by MOFCOM in 2009-2011 on inbound (as well as on many domestic) M&A deals that were referred for merger control review under the 2008 Anti-Monopoly Law, which brought domestic enterprises into the orbit of such reviews, effectively abolishing discrimination against foreign investors in this regard. 13 Only one of these (Coca-Cola/Huiyuan) was rejected, but several others were allowed only with strong conditions. Although the Government's actions are perceived as "aggressive" and the procedures are often dragged out to the maximum (i.e., a full 30 days for each of two successive reviews), they have not prevented major global MNEs from continuing to invest in China.
In August 2011, China issued a set of detailed procedures for national security reviews of foreign acquisitions of domestic Chinese enterprises, effective September 1, 2011. The grounds for a review include the obvious one -that the enterprise to be acquired is in a military or military-related industrybut also the rather wider condition that the acquisition is in a category of industries classed as being related to "national economic security", including major agricultural products, major energy and resources, infrastructure, transport, and key technologies. It does not appear at present that this will stop inward cross-border M&A deals that would otherwise have gone ahead. Instead, it may simply make the approval process more transparent, as decisions now have to be taken explicitly on national security grounds, and those decisions have to be explained. The procedures could, however, be operated in a more protectionist vein if a future administration decided to raise barriers against foreign investment.
In Full convertibility of the Chinese yuan (CNY or renminbi) is still far away. In the 1990s it was touted as a possibility by the end of the century, but this aim was thwarted by successive international economic crises, so the current goal of full convertibility in 2015 remains uncertain. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government is taking small steps toward it when it suits its trade and investment policies. A recent notice of the Ministry of Commerce allows foreign investors to invest with Chinese yuan obtained lawfully outside China. In practice, this means using the rapidly developing Chinese yuan market in Hong Kong (China), which is soon to be joined by a Chinese yuan market in the adjacent city of Shenzhen.
In recent years, the Government has been trying to rein in the over-rapid growth of fixed investment as part of its efforts both to rebalance the economy in favor of private consumption and away from dependence on fixed investment as the main driver of economic growth and, especially since the remarkably successful stimulus program that followed the onset of the global economic crisis, to curb the 12 All these measures are detailed in the forthcoming China Investment Policy Review Update 2012, to be published by the OECD. 13 For details, see ibid.
runaway property market. This policy has coincided with a more selective approach to attracting FDI than was evident in the 1990s, when the emphasis was, in practice if not in theory, on maximizing the quantity of FDI. One result has been that the tightening of the real estate market during the first half of 2012 brought about a 12.4% year-on-year decrease in utilized FDI in real estate, far greater than the 3% overall decline in FDI.
Conclusions
There are several reasons to expect growth in China's FDI inflows to decelerate in 2012 and beyond, as has indeed been forecast by the Chinese Government itself. 15 Economic problems in home countries are likely to slow, or even diminish, the supply of IFDI. There will probably be only sluggish economic growth in the United States and Japan, while the United Kingdom and several large Eurozone economies may well experience a recession in 2012. Some large MNEs in these countries are going through a tough period when they will be more concerned with profitability, or even survival, rather than overseas expansion.
Extending the "jobless recovery" evident in those developed countries fortunate enough to be enjoying a recovery, many MNEs will continue to look abroad for cheaper labor, but they are decreasingly likely to find it in China. Wages have gone up markedly in China's export powerhouse, Guangdong, and will doubtless do so elsewhere as investors respond by moving inland. Lower-wage countries like Indonesia and Vietnam are already starting to benefit -quite consciously and actively -from this shift.
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Nevertheless, overall, China remains the most popular target for FDI among developing host countries. In the latest UNCTAD survey of MNEs, China ranked well above all the others in the number of times it was mentioned as a top priority. 17 Policy emphasis in China itself is switching toward promoting outward, rather than inward, investment, though national and sub-national investment promotion agencies will remain active in their efforts to encourage IFDI in activities considered important for China's rapidly growing economy and its sustainable development. Since the second half of the 2000, it has been apparent that fixed investment growth in China is unsustainably high -often in real-terms double-digit percentage growth in recent years 18 -and that fixed investment is an excessively large proportion of GDP.
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The authorities have striven to rein in fixed investment growth and achieve a rebalancing of the economy toward domestic consumption, while also curbing the growth of the country's absurdly high foreign exchange reserves (US$ 3.2 trillion at the end of June 2012. 20 This environment is unlikely to encourage continued stress by policy-makers on pulling in foreign capital to prop up fixed investment, and focus is likely to shift to more specific objectives for attracting FDI. When the "open door" policy was initiated in the late 1970s, China did not have strong companies and export markets, let alone homegrown industries producing modern consumer goods, or a financial sector capable of financial intermediation. It does now. Many of the things that foreign companies needed to do can now be done by Chinese firms. Chinese corporations are now strong enough at home to be able to challenge foreign competitors, and they have their champions in the bureaucracy who consider foreign investment to be a malign influence. 21 So far, suggestions that the Government use the new Anti-Monopoly Law and national security screening procedures to protect domestic competitors appear to have been rejected in favor of operating these instruments in a fairly transparent, if sometimes time-consuming, manner, but there will undoubtedly be pressure on them from the domestic corporate sector to be tougher on foreign investors. It is also less necessary to use IFDI to attain global technological heights, as Chinese MNEs now have the money to undertake technology-gaining investments overseas, though they may still find it more convenient and quick to use IFDI for this purpose. Foreign-invested enterprises have consistently punched above their weight in creating millions of jobs in addition to the number of workers they employ directly. This is also something that Chinese companies can do, particularly the private sector SMEs, once they are let off the leash.
The Chinese Government is, for the above reasons, now far less motivated to attract large quantities of FDI, and far more interested in improving the quality of FDI. As noted, the latest Catalogue for Guiding Foreign Investment Industries continues the trend of encouraging FDI in "green" sub-sectors, while adjusting the incentives-mix to current industrial needs. While this shopping list is aspirational, it is also a clear indication that the Government is trying to move away from attracting labor-intensive, low technology investment and toward more efficient, more productive and less polluting investment. 
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Statistical annex
Annex 
100.0%
Note: The Chinese authorities include "utilities" and "construction" in the secondary sector, and the MOFCOM figures do not include all activities; so it is not possible to disaggregate and reconstruct the sectoral statistics entirely from their published tables. See the official definition of sectors from the annual statistical yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics. In China economic activities are categorized into the following three strata of industry: (1) "Primary industry" refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and services in support of these industries. (2) "Secondary industry" refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction. (3) 
